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A REVIEW OF FISCAL POLICY REFORMS 
IN THE ASEAN COUNTRIES IN THE 1980s* 
Rosario G. Manasan** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The first half of the eighties posed serious challenges to 
the economies of the ASEAN member countries. The period bore 
witness to the ramifications of the second oil shock, the 
prolonged international economic recession, and the deterioration 
in the price of most primary exports, including oil. These 
external shocks constituted the acid test for the strengths (and 
weaknesses) of the exuberant economies of the ASEAN nations. 
Unfortunately, all have been found wanting, albeit in varying 
degrees. Thus, during the period, all of the ASEAN countries 
suffered (1) severe macroeconomic imbalances that were manifested 
in some combination of the following problems: large twin 
deficits (current account as well as fiscal), high real interest 
rates, inflation, and huge external debt overhang; and/or (2) a 
slowdown in their economies' growth, if not outright economic 
recessions. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand 
had to contend with bloated fiscal and current account deficits 
(relative to secular trends in each country) in 1980-1983, and 
1985/1986 with the former preceding the latter in Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand in the earlier period. Indonesia 
suffered a recession in 1982, Malaysia and Singapore in 1985, and 
the Philippines in 1984-1985 (Table 1). 
*Paper presented during the 14th Federation of ASEAN 
Economic Association Conference, November 16-18, 1989, Manila, 
Philippines. 
**Research Fellow, Philippine Institute for Development 
Studies. 
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Table 1 SELECTED INDICATORS OP ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN ASEAN COUNTRIES, 1978-•1988 (In %) 
Fiscal Growth Fiscal Surplus Year Rate Current (Deficit)/ Country Ending Real GDP Acct./GDP GDP 
INDONESIA 1978 7.8 -2.6 -3.1 1979 6.1 1.8 -2.2 1980 8.0 3.9 -2.3 1981 7.4 -0.6 -2.0 1982 -0.3 -5.6 -1.9 1983 3.2 -7.8 -2.5 1984 6.1 -2.2 1.4 1985 2.5 -2.3 -1.0 1986 4.0 -5.2 -3.8 1987 3.4 -3.1 -0.9 1988 5.4 2.6 -3.1 
MALAYSIA 1978 6.8 0.7 -7.7 1979 9.4 4.4 -7.9 1980 7.5 -1.2 -13.3 1981 6.9 -9.9 -19.1 1982 5.9 -13.5 -17.9 1983 6.4 -11.6 -13.2 1984 7.9 -4.8 -8.9 1985 -1.1 -2.0 -7.4 1986 1.4 -0.4 -10.6 1987 5.3 8.1 -7.8 1988 8.9 5.2 -4.3 
PHILIPPINES 1978 5.5 -4.5 -1.2 1979 6.3 -5.1 -0.2 1980 5.2 -5.4 -1.3 1981 3.9 -5.3 -4.0 1982 2.9 -8.0 -4.2 1983 0.9 -7.9 -1.9 1984 -6.0 -3.9 -1.9 1985 -4.3 -0.1 -1.8 1986 1.4 3.2 -5.0 1987 4.6 -1.4 -2.4 1988 6.4 -1.0 -2.8 
SINGAPORE 1978 8.6 -5.8 0.8 1979 9.3 -7.8 2.3 1980 9.7 -13.3 2.1 1981 9.6 -10.6 0.7 1982 6.8 -8.5 3.4 1983 8.2 -3.5 1.8 1984 8.3 -2.0 4.1 1985 -1.5 -0.0 2.1 1986 1.8 3.1 1.5 1987 8.8 2.8 -2.8 1988 11.0 6.9 
THAILAND 1978 10.6 -4.8 -3.6 1979 5.1 -7.6 3.7 1980 4.6 -6.4 4.9 1981 6.3 -7.4 -3.4 1982 4.0 -2.9 -6.6 1983 7.1 -7.3 -4.0 1984 7.1 -5.1 -3.5 1985 3.5 -4.2 -5.5 1986 4.4 0.6 -4.4 1987 8.1 -0.7 -2.3 1988 10.9 -2.9 1.0 
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Given this setting, it is not surprising, therefore, to find 
that fiscal policy reform has played a key role in the adjustment 
process in the ASEAN region in the eighties. The effective 
management of the fiscal deficit in terms of both its size and 
financing is an important feature of any attempt to effect a 
correction of the aforementioned external/internal disequilibria, 
i.e., stabilization. At the same time, the imperative of 
sustained economic growth dictates the necessity of reform in the 
structure of the tax system as well as in the composition of 
government spending, i.e., structural adjustment, in order to 
minimize, if not totally eliminate, existing distortions in the 
incentive structure thereby promoting the development of key 
sectors. 
The policy instruments for stabilization, on the one hand, 
consist of variations in the fiscal aggregates of public 
revenues, spending, deficit and debt, and are expected to affect 
other equally broad macroeconomic variables like the interest 
rate, inflation, and the current account balance via the demand 
side. On the other hand, the instruments that fall under 
structural adjustment policies include modifications in the tax 
rates, tax bases, tax administration, and the quality and 
distribution (in both the economic and the functional sense) of 
government expenditures. These policy handles are expected to 
work on enhancing overall efficiency via the supply side. Thus, 
the first group of policies may be viewed as macro instruments 
while the second group is best described as basically micro level 
instruments. The potential conflict between these two sets of 
policies cannot be overemphasized, most particularly in the 
fiscal arena. Successful adjustment requires careful and 
conscious effort on the part of policymakers to come up with the 
appropriate mix of instruments as well as the precise timing and 
phasing of their implementation. 
The purpose of this paper is to review the recent experience 
of the ASEAN countries in the area of fiscal policy reform and to 
cull the major lessons that emerge from such an undertaking. 1/ 
Our emphasis will be on the structural fiscal policy adjustments 
specifically in the field of tax and expenditure policy. We 
recognize that privatization and the reform of the public 
enterprise sector are important aspects of structural fiscal 
reform but time and resource constraints prevent us from 
including them in this review. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four parts. 
Section II reviews variations in broad fiscal aggregates as a 
background to the structural fiscal reforms that were undertaken. 
Section III presents the ASEAN countries' tax policy reform 
MBrunei is not included in this study because of the dearth 
of data and references. 
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experience while Section IV focuses on the changing size and 
composition of government expenditures in the region. 
II. FISCAL BALANCE: THE SETTING TO FISCAL POLICY REFORM 
The eighties was an extremely difficult time for most of the 
ASEAN countries. Most of them had to contend with high fiscal 
deficits resulting from the pursuit of countercyclical fiscal 
policy during the global recession of the early 1980s. To 
compound their problems, foreign financing of their budgetary 
deficits started to dry up as the debt problem reached global 
proportions. In this section, we provide a brief run-through of 
the fiscal adjustments that were undertaken by the different 
ASEAN countries during this period. 
By law, Indonesia is supposed to have a balanced budget. 
However, in fact, external aids and loans are included under 
revenues so that despite the balanced budget law, Indonesia had 
good-sized fiscal deficits during the 1980s. From 1978 to 1981, 
government expenditures including net lending increased rapidly 
in Indonesia, peaking at 25.6 percent of GDP in 1981. Although 
taxes were buoyant during this period because of the high price 
of oil, government savings were not enough to cover the large 
public investment program. Note that by any standard, government 
capital outlays in this period averaging at 10.6 percent of GDP 
were high. In 1981, faced with the prospects of lower oil prices 
in the future and the implied fiscal difficulties given the heavy 
reliance on oil revenues, the Indonesian government started to 
prepare the groundwork for tax reform and also expenditure 
adjustment. In 1983, the implementation of major public 
investment projects were rescheduled. In 1984-1985, a 
comprehensive tax reform was adopted. Thus, when oil revenues 
declined from 1984 onwards, the government was able to keep its 
deficit under control for most of the remaining years in the 
eighties. In 1986, the deficit rose to 3.8 percent of GDP as a 
result of an expansionary expenditure program coupled with the 
severe erosion of oil revenues in that year when oil prices 
reached rock bottom. By 1987, though, its fiscal balance has 
recovered as a result of restraints on the expenditure side. In 
1988, a deficit equal to 3.1 percent of GDP emerged once again 
due to a further decline in government revenues. 
Malaysia, on the other hand, pursued countercyclical fiscal 
policy in the early eighties as it attempted to shield its 
domestic economy from the recession in the industrialized 
countries. Thus, 1980-1983 were years of extremely large fiscal 
deficits. The biggest deficit was registered in 1981 and was 
equal to 19.1 percent of GDP. Coupled with external 
disequilibrium as manifested in equally huge current account 
deficits in 1982-1983, the fiscal stance proved unsustainable and 
the government embarked on a policy of fiscal restraint which it 
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has not abandoned since then. Malaysia relied heavily on 
expenditure control rather than on revenue generation. Thus, by 
1988, its total expenditure inclusive of net lending was cut to 
28.3 percent of GDP as against the 46.6 percent level in 1981. 
In this way, Malaysia was able to attain a more comfortable 
fiscal deficit amounting to 4.3 percent of GDP in 1988 although 
total revenues as a proportion of GDP declined from 27.4 percent 
in 1981 to 23.9 percent in 1988. 
The Philippines, like Malaysia, was on a binge in 1980-1982, 
as it pursued an expansionary countercyclical expenditure 
program. Maybe because of easy access to external sources of 
financing in those years, little attention was paid to domestic 
resource mobilization resulting in the deterioration of tax 
revenues to an all time low of 9.9 percent of GDP. Consequently, 
the fiscal deficit ballooned to 4.2 percent of GDP in 1982. As a 
reflection of the underlying macroeconomic imbalance, the current 
account deficit also soared in 1983. In 1983-1985, the 
Philippines experienced its worst recession since Independence. 
Thus, the Philippines had no choice but to undertake a program of 
fiscal austerity to help bring about the correction of the 
external/internal disequilibria. Government expenditures were 
cut deeply particularly capital expenditures. In 1986, with a 
new administration in power, the government adopted a tax reform 
program. While the expenditure aggregates seem to indicate that 
the government has relaxed somewhat in 1986-1988, a closer 
examination of the data reveals that total expenditures net of 
debt service were below their trend levels. The country's debt 
burden has led an increase in interest payments making the 
government budget appear larger than what it really is. 
Singapore has always enjoyed a strong fiscal position. 
Except in 1966 and 1967, the central government has always been 
in a surplus position. What triggered the move towards fiscal 
policy reform in Singapore in the 1980s was the negative rate of 
growth experienced by the economy in 1985. Thus, in 1986, the 
government implemented the elements of a tax reform program. 
Given the proximate reason for the reform, it is therefore not 
surprising that it took on a rather interventionist approach. 
Revenues declined with the reform. Government expenditures were 
also increased in 1986. Consequently, the fiscal surplus was 
reduced in that year. In a sense, the changes undertaken had all 
the elements of a Keynesian demand management program. 
Thailand's story is very similar to that of Malaysia and the 
Philippines. Fiscal expansion in the early eighties resulted in 
high fiscal deficits. The current account also posted a large 
deficit in 1983. In response, the government implemented a tax 
reform program in 1986 coupled with tight expenditure controls. 
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III. TAX POLICY REFORM 
The eighties, perhaps more than any other period in recent 
history, witnessed an almost overwhelming wave of tax reform 
efforts across the globe. The ASEAN region is no exception. 
However, Table 2 shows that the tax reform initiatives in the 
various ASEAN countries are widely diverse. This paper therefore 
makes use of the taxonomy of tax reform attributes outlined in 
Gillis (1989a) . It is hoped that this will facilitate a 
systematic comparison of this experience. He proposed six 
general characteristics that may be utilized to classify various 
tax reform initiatives, namely: (1) breadth of reform (tax 
structure vs. tax system, i.e., tax structure plus tax 
administration); (2) scope of reform (comprehensive vs. partial 
reform); (3) revenue goals (revenue enhancing vs. revenue neutral 
reform); (4) equity goals (distributionally neutral vs. 
redistributive reform); (5) resource allocation goals 
(economically neutral vs. interventionist reform); and (6) timing 
of reform (contemporaneous vs. phased reform). 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the ASEAN tax reform 
measures based on these six attributes, the next sub-section 
presents a description of the changing trends in the level and 
composition of tax and nontax revenues in ASEAN. The purpose 
here is to provide a statistical perspective against which to 
evaluate the tax reform initiatives in the ASEAN region. 
A. Trends in the Tax Level and its CompositiQn 
Tables 3 and 4 present trends in the level and composition 
of government revenues in the ASEAN countries. The variation in 
the ratio of total government revenue to GDP across countries is 
greater than that of the tax revenue to GDP ratio. In terms of 
total revenues, Singapore registered the highest ratio (32.8 
percent) in 1988, while the oil-producers, Indonesia and 
Malaysia, ranked first (with some 16.0 percent) in terms of the 
total tax ratio in 1988. In both cases, the Philippines was at 
the bottom with a total revenue to GDP ratio of 13.7 percent and 
a total tax to GDP ratio of 10.9 percent. If taxes from oil were 
excluded, Indonesia is left with the lowest tax ratio of only 
7.4 percent in 1988. 
Between 1978 and 1988, only Thailand exhibited an upward 
trend, which was particularly pronounced in 1987-1988, in the 
total revenue and total tax ratios. Between 1980 and 1985, the 
Philippine ratios declined markedly. From 1986 onwards, 
however, there was some recovery. Similarly, while the total tax 
ratio in Indonesia showed a well defined downward trend in 1980-
1987, its non-oil tax ratio started to rise in 1985. In 
contrast, the tax ratios of both Malaysia and Singapore declined 
in 1986 and 1987. We note that the shifts observed here are 
consistent with the timing and the nature of the tax reforms 
undertaken by these countries in the eighties. 
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Table 2 
SALIENT FEATURES OF TAX REFORM MEASURES IN ASEAN IN THE 1980s 
INDONESIA 
Income Tax 
A global income tax system is put in place. It replaced 
four different taxes on individuals, businesses, interest, 
dividends and royalties, and withholding tax on employment. 
Income tax rates were lowered with the top marginal rate now 
set at 35 percent against the previous 50 percent rate for 
individual income and the 45 percent for corporate income. 
The number of income brackets was also reduced to three. 
Personal exemption level was raised. 
Fringe benefits provided by companies, donations, and 
insurance premiums are considered nondeductible costs. 
Depreciation system was simplified. New system is based on 
open-ended accounting with assets classified into four 
groups. The double declining method is prescribed for the 
computation of the depreciation charges all assets except 
those in the building class. 
Loss carry forward is allowed for five years. 
Mechanism for withholding tax was simplified. 
Charitable contributions are no longer tax deductible. 
Income of civil servants are now subject to tax. 
The use of special norms to compute tax of small businesses 
is introduced. 
All tax incentives were abolished. 
The previous system of using "official assessment" to 
compute tax liability is replaced by self-assessment method. 
Computerization of the tax collection machinery. 
Value-added Tax 
A consumption type, destination principle value-added tax 
using the tax credit method was adopted in place of the 
turnover tax. 
The tax rate is 10 percent on all taxable goods and services 
except exports which are zero-rated. 
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Table 2 (cont'd) 
Taxable goods include all manufactured goods. Taxable 
services are limited to construction. Unprocessed food are 
effectively outside of the VAT net. 
Small firms, those with an annual turnover less than Rp. 60 
million, are exempt from VAT. 
The VAT is complemented by the imposition of. a sales tax on 
certain luxury items. 
Property Tax 
The tax base was changed from the annual rental value to the 
capital market value. 
Buildings were granted an exemption equal to Rp. 2 million. 
Exemptions from the property tax was restricted. 
MALAYSIA 
Personal Income Tax 
The marginal tax rates are lowered from the 6-55 percent 
range to the 5-40 percent range. The tax brackets were also 
widened. 
Personal tax relief, deductions for children, allowance for 
children educated abroad, exemption from tax on interest 
were increased. 
Corporate Income Tax 
The rate was reduced to 35 percent. 
Investment incentives were made more liberal. Accelerated 
depreciation allowance and reinvestment allowance extended 
to 1988. Abatement against adjusted income granted to 
exporters. Special abatement incentives were granted for 
geographical location, use of local raw materials, and to 
small firms. 
Sales and Excise Taxes 
Definition of "small" manufacturers who are not required to 
pay the sales tax was liberalized. 
Sales and excise tax on certain consumer durables were 
abolished. 
Sales tax rate was increased from five percent to 10 percent. 
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Table 2 (cont'd) 
Coverage of sales tax on services was broadened. 
Excise tax on liquor and tobacco products were increased and 
converted from specific to ad valorem basis. 
Excise duties on locally assembled cars were increased. 
Motor Vehicle Taxes 
Road tax was increased. Registration and other charges on motor vehicles were increased. 
Road tax on company cars was reduced from four to two times 
of the road tax on privately owned petrol cars. 
Export Duties 
Export duties on all fruits and spices except pepper were abolished. 
Export duty on palm oil was revised to encourage greater 
incentive for local processing. 
Import Duties 
Import duties on cars, liqour, tobacco products were 
increased. 
Surtax on raw materials was incorporated in the import duty. 
Import duties in foodstuffs, garments and manufactured goods were revised upwards. 
PHILIPPINES 
Personal Income Tax 
The rate structure for compensation and business incomes was 
unified, effectively reducing the tax rate on business 
income. 
Final tax on interest income, royalties and winnings was 
increased to 20 percent. 
Tax on dividends was abolished. 
Exemptions levels were increased. 
Separate taxation of the incomes of spouses was adopted. 
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Table 2 (cont'd) 
Corporate Income Tax 
The graduated rate structure of 25-35 percent was replaced 
by a flat 35 percent rate. 
The investment incentives system was revised. Notably, the 
income tax holiday was introduced. 
value-added Tax 
A consumption type, destination principle VAT using the tax 
credit method was adopted. It replaced the manufacturer's 
sales tax, the miller's tax, the contractor's tax, the 
broker's tax, the tax on lessors of personal property and 
other fixed taxes. 
The tax rate is 10 percent on all taxable goods and 
services. Exports are zero rated while agricultural 
products, major inputs to agriculture, most petroleum 
products, books and other printed materials, utilities, 
financial, medical, educational, transport, communication 
and other services and sales of small entities are exempted. 
It is complemented by an excise tax on luxury items. 
Excise Tax 
The specific basis was converted to an ad valorem basis. 
Excise tax on fuel oil was abolished. 
Other Taxes 
All export duties except that on logs was abolished. 
Tax expenditures were restricted. 
SINGAPORE 
Personal Income Tax 
The marginal tax rate schedule was reduced from 6-55 percent 
to 3-33 percent. 
An across-the-board 25 percent rebate of the tax liability 
was given in 1986. ^ 
Child relief for "qualified women" was increased. 
Corporate Income Tax 
The rate was reduced from 40 percent to 33 percent. 
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Table 2 (cont'd) 
Accelerated depreciation of all new plant equipment is 
allowed in all sectors, not just manufacturing. Computer 
equipment may be expensed rather than depreciated. 
Investment allowance is also provided to both manufacturing 
and service companies. 
50 percent exemption of tax on profits in excess of a fixed 
base is granted to warehousing and servicing industries and 
international consultancy services. 
Tax relief for R&D expenditures is granted to approved 
companies. 
Tax incentives are granted to companies investing in new 
technologies and nontraditional areas-. 
Coverage of incentive scheme for fund management was 
broadened. 
Other Taxes 
The payroll tax was suspended beginning in April 1985. 
The Skills Development Fund (SDF) levy was reduced from four 
percent to two percent. 
Property tax rebate of 30 percent, then 50 percent was 
granted from 1985 to 1988. The rate of the development levy 
was cut from 70 percent to 50 percent. 
Tax on PUB gas, electricity charges, and sugar were 
suspended. Ad valorem duty on petrol was reduced from 60 
percent to 50 percent. 
THAILAND 
Personal Income Tax 
— ~ The marginal rate schedule was reduced from 7-65 percent to 7-55 percent. 
The number of income brackets was reduced from 13 to 11. 
Interest on housing loans was made deductible. 
Tax on interest from fixed deposits was increased from 12.5 
percent to 15 percent. Interest from dfovernment bonds, 
cooperative savings and deposits and other interest income 
are now taxed. 
12 
Table 2 (cont'd) 
Gains on sales of certain securities are now subject to tax 
of 15 percent. 
Corporate Income Tax 
The tax rate was reduced from 40 percent to 35 percent. 
Tax on nonprofit organizations was increased from five 
percent to 10 percent. 
Presumptive taxation of small firms was introduced. 
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Table 3 
AGGREGATE REVENUE INDICATORS IN ASEAN COUNTRIES 
1978-1988 
Country 
INDONESIA 
MALAYSIA 
PHILIPPINES 
SINGAPORE 
THAILAND 
[seal Non-oil Nontax 
rear Total Tax Revenue/ Oil Tax/ Tax/ Revenue/ 
iding Revenue/GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP 
1978 18.2 17.0 9.6 7.4 1.3 
1979 20.5 18.9 12.4 6.6 1.6 
1980 21.3 20.2 14.3 5.9 1.0 
1981 23.6 20.3 14.8 5.6 3.3 
1982 20.5 19.1 13.0 6.1 1.4 
1983 21.0 18.8 12.1 6.0 2.2 
1984 21.5 17.5 12.0 5.5 4.0 
1985 21.5 18.8 11.8 7.0 2.7 
1986 22.2 15.6 7.7 8.0 6.6 
1987 21.9 16.7 8.8 7.7 5.2 
1988 18.1 16.1 2.0 
1978 23.3 20.0 2.0 17.9 3.4 
1979 22.6 19.4 1.8 17.5 3.3 
1980 26.1 22.6 4.5 18.1 3.5 
1981 27.4 21.9 5.6 16.3 5.6 
1982 26.7 20.1 5.5 14.6 6.6 
1983 26.8 21.9 5.0 17.0 4.8 
1984 26.2 20.7 5.3 15.5 5.4 
1985 27.2 21.5 6.2 15.4 5.7 
1986 27.4 20.6 5.8 14.8 6.8 
1987 23.1 15.9 3.4 12.4 7.2 
1988 23.9 16.4 7.5 
1978 13.6 11.5 2.0 
1979 13.6 11.9 1.6 
1980 13.1 11.5 1.6 
1981 11.8 10.3 1.5 
1982 11.2 9.9 1.3 
1983 11.9 10.4 1.5 
1984 10.5 9.3 1.3 
1985 11.3 10.1 1.3 
1986 12.6 10.4 2.2 
1987 14.6 12.1 2.4 
1988 13.7 10.9 2.7 
1978 23.8 16.4 7.1 
1979 25.2 16.5 7.3 
1980 26.4 17.5 7.8 
1981 29.6 18.5 8.1 
1982 30.8 19.7 8.0 
1983 31.9 19.4 10.3 
1984 29.0 18.4 10.2 
1985 37.7 16.4 11.2 
1986 39.2 13.6 13.6 
1987 32.8 14.2 16.6 
1978 12.9 11.7 1.1 
1979 13.8 12.4 1.1 
1980 13.8 13.2 1.2 
1981 14.9 13.5 1.5 
1982 15.6 13.0 1.4 
1983 17.1 14.3 - 1.4 
1984 16.7 14.3 1.4 
1985 16.9 14.3 1.8 
1986 17.0 14.1 1.6 
1987 18.3 14.1 1.5 
1988 20.6 15.8 1.4 
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Table 4 (cont'd) 
Country 
Fiscal 
Year 
Ending 
Taxes on Income 
and Profits 
Taxes on 
International Trade Other Taxes 
/GDP /Total Tax /GDP Total Tax /GDP Total Tax 
PHILIPPINES 1978 3.1 26.8 4.4 38.3 4.0 34.9 
1979 2.9 23.9 4.4 36.5 4.7 39.6 
1980 2.8 23.8 4.4 38.0 4.4 38.2 
1981 2.5 24.7 3.7 35.4 4,1 39.9 
1982 2.5 24.9 3.6 35.8 3.9 39.3 
1983 2.4 22.7 4.3 41.4 3.7 35.9 
1984 2.3 24.2 3.2 34.3 3.9 41.5 
1985 3.1 30.5 2.8 27.4 4.2 42.1 
1986 3.1 29.2 2.8 26.7 4.6 44.0 
1987 3.1 25.4 3.7 30.3 5.4 44.4 
1988 3.3 30.3 3.1 28.3 4.5 41.4 
SINGAPORE 1978 7.2 45.2 3.1 19.2 5.7 35.7 
1979 6.8 43.4 2.9 18.2 6.0 38.4 
1980 7.6 46.5 2.7 16.4 6.0 37.2 
1981 9.0 50.5 2.4 13.3 6.4 36.2: 
1982 9.9 52.5 2.3 12.3 6.6 35.1 
1983 9.6 49.8 2.3 12.1 7.4 38.1 
1984 8.9 47.0 2.5 13.1 7.6 39.9 
1985 7.7 44.4 2.5 14.5 7.2 41.1 
1986 5.8 43.0 2.2 16.3 5.5 40.6 
1987 5.6 42.7 2.2 17.0 5.3 40.3 
1988 5.9 42.0 2.3 16.4 5.9 41.6 
THAILAND 1978 2.3 20.1 3.3 27.7 6.4 51.9 
1979 2.5 19.9 3.4 27.6 6.6 52.8 
1980 2.6 19.4 3.8 26.2 6.8 54.2 
1981 2.8 21.1 3.6 25.1 7.0 53.2 
1982 3.0 23.0 2.9 20.9 7.0 55.4 
1983 2.9 20.5 3.2 22.6 7.6 55.8 
1984 3.2 22.3 3.5 24.3 7.8 53.4 
1985 3.3 23.3 3.3 22.2 7.7 56.0 
1986 3.3 23.1 2.9 20.5 7.7 55.8 
1987 2.9 20.1 3.2 20.8 8.8 57.7 
1988 3.4 21.6 3.9 24.9 8.4 53.5 
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It is only in Singapore and Malaysia where nontax revenues 
account for a large portion of total government revenues. In 
Singapore, this share has been increasing in the 1980s such that 
by 1988, it has exceeded the 50 percent of total revenues. A 
similar trend was observed in Malaysia but its nontax revenues 
accounted for only 31.3 percent of total revenues in the same 
year. In Thailand and Indonesia, the share of nontax revenues to 
total revenues has been maintained at less than 10 percent. In 
the Philippines, it was just slightly higher than 10 percent in 
the early eighties but has increased significantly since 1986. 
Direct taxes account for over 50 percent of total taxes in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Note, however, that if oil 
revenues were not included, direct taxes in Indonesia and 
Malaysia would not be as important. The share of direct taxes to 
total tax revenues is lowest in Thailand at less than 25 percent 
for most of the eighties. In 1986, this sank lower to less than 
20 percent. On the other hand, the contribution of direct taxes 
to total tax collections in the Philippines was just as low as 
that of Thailand in the years before 1985. After that year, the 
share of direct taxes rose to 30 percent. 
Domestic indirect taxes account for about 55 and 40 percent 
of total tax revenues in Thailand and the Philippines, 
respectively. This suggests that any reform of the tax system, 
if it is to be meaningful, should tackle problems/issues in this 
area squarely. 
International trade taxes (tariffs and export duties) are an 
important revenue source in the Philippines, Malaysia and 
Thailand, contributing from 25 to 3 0 percent of tax revenues at 
the start of the eighties. In these countries, however, the 
reliance on this tax has been on the wane because of the recent 
reform of their tariff systems. 
B. Breadth, Scope and Timing of Reform 
In 1984—1985, Indonesia restructured its tax system with 
wide ranging changes introduced in tax structure as well as in 
tax administration. The Indonesian case has been cited as one of 
the most comprehensive and successful tax reform initiatives 
worldwide in the last decade (Jenkins 1988). Its success is 
attributed to the substantial amount of lead time, prior.to the 
reform, spent in the conduct of technical studies of various 
features of the tax system (Harberger 1989). 
The Philippines, likewise, implemented a massive overhaul of 
its tax structure in 1986, soon after the Aquino government's 
ascent into power. , While the Philippine government has had a 
propensity to tinker with its tax system year after year, the 
1986 tax package is truly deserving of being called tax reform 
because of the scope of the modifications that were 
instituted. As originally envisioned, the package will consist 
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of changes in both structure and administration. To date, 
however, no significant improvements in the administrative and 
compliance aspects have been put in place. The introduction of 
the value added tax (VAT) in 1988 forms part of the whole package 
enacted in 1986. However, a lot of initial problems were 
encountered in the implementation. Said problems may be traced 
to the inadequacy of the preparatory steps that were taken. 
Faced with the 1985 economic recession, the Singapore 
government convened the Economic Committee with representatives 
from both the public and private sectors to assess the country's 
economic performance and prospects for future growth. The 
Committee came up with a Report in July 1985 which recommended, 
among others, a major tax restructuring for Singapore (Lim et al. 
1988). From July 1985 onwards, a number of the Committee's 
proposals have been implemented. To date, however, the 
government has not acted upon a number of them. It is also worth 
noting that some of the tax measures enacted were supposed to be 
operational only until the economy has fully recovered (Asher 
1987) . 
In February 1986, Thailand enacted revisions in its Revenue 
Code. The changes covered all parts of the Code, namely, the 
structure of most of the major taxes and tax administration. 
There are indications that further restructuring of Thailand's 
tax system are still being envisioned by its policymakers 
(Silpakul 1986). 
Numerous changes were also introduced in the tax system of 
Malaysia in the 1980s. They took the form of inclusions in the 
annual budget documents. While the modifications that were put 
in place covered practically the whole tax spectrum, they are 
usually perceived as piecemeal measures (Asher and Jomo 1987). 
To use Gillis' (1989a) terminology, they represent tax 
adjustments rather than tax reform. In response to this problem, 
the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research set up a Tax Reform 
Group in 1987. The Group's recommendations were submitted to the 
Treasury in 1988 and are currently the subject of debate and 
further studies (Asher 1989). 
C. Revenue Goals 
Virmani (1988) noted that revenue generation is the most 
common objective in tax reform. Given the serious fiscal 
adjustments necessary to restore internal/external balance in 
most of these countries in the period immediately preceding the 
institution of tax reform measures, it is rather unexpected that 
in the ASEAN region, revenue enhancement does not seem to receive 
much attention. 
In Malaysia and Singapore, recent tax changes are generally 
perceived to be revenue reducing (Asher 1987, Asher and Jomo 
1987). Singapore has traditionally enjoyed surpluses in its 
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fiscal balance so that revenue enhancement was not a major 
concern. Furthermore, since the immediate objective is economic 
recovery, the framers of the new tax package appear to be driven 
by the desire to stimulate domestic demand. Thus, most of the 
measures enacted under its reform program took the form of tax 
expenditures and tax cuts, e.g., property tax rebate, reduction 
in the Skills Development Fund (SDF) levy, suspension of the 
payroll tax, reduction of corporate income and personal income 
tax rates, more liberal approval of applications for investment 
allowance, accelerated depreciation allowance for new plant 
equipment in all sectors (not just manufacturing), and numerous 
other investment incentives. Similarly, a general lowering of 
the tax rates and a narrowing of the base (as in the allowance of 
more generous exemptions and deductions, from personal income, 
more liberal tax incentives, increased depreciation allowances 
and more limited applicability of the excise and sales taxes with 
respect to consumer durables) featured prominently in the tax 
adjustments undertaken by Malaysia. Although the Malaysian 
government, in response to the fiscal difficulties of 1981-1982, 
doubled (to 10 percent) the sales tax on goods and services and 
significantly increased the road tax, these upward movements were 
partially reversed in 1985-1986. In the 1989 budget, the 
reduction in the corporate income tax rate from 40 to 35 percent, 
the abolition of the development tax and the broadening of the 
coverage of fiscal incentives are expected to further erode the 
revenue yield of the tax system despite some widening of the 
sales tax base (Asher 1989). 
Official policy pronouncements in the Philippines indicate 
that while increased revenue generation was an important 
consideration, nonrevenue objectives were not sacrificed for 
revenue enhancement in the formulation of the 1986 tax reform 
program. For instance, in attempting to rationalize the 
individual income tax, the tax on business income was effectively 
reduced. Towards the end of 1987, the excise tax on petroleum 
product was restructured whereby the tax on fuel oil was 
abolished. The negative impact on revenue generation is not 
negligible since petroleum products have traditionally accounted 
for a significant proportion of total tax revenues. However, the 
tax on interest was increased from 17.5 percent to 20 percent 
while the corporate income tax was changed from the two-tiered 
25-35 percent levy to a flat 35 percent rate. A one-time tax 
amnesty program was also put in place. Furthermore, the 
expediency of meeting the resource gap has led the Philippine 
government to introduce several new tax measures that are 
primarily aimed at raising additional revenues in 1990. These 
measures are not part of the original reform program instituted 
in 1986. They include sharp increases in the excise tax on so-
called sin products like cigarettes and beer. 
Indonesia initiated its tax reform efforts with the 
preparation of technical studies in 1981 when the country's 
fiscal position was fairly strong. Thus, as originally 
1? 
conceived, the tax reform package was designed to be revenue 
neutral. However, by 1983, it became apparent that the decline 
in the expected revenues from the oil sector necessitated a more 
aggressive resource mobilization stance (particularly from the 
non-oil sector) on the part of the government (Gillis 1989a). 
While tax rates were lowered in certain cases, the elimination of 
numerous tax exemptions effectively broadened the tax base. A 
strengthening of the fiscal machinery in terms of improved tax 
administration is another important trait of the Indonesian tax 
reform that augurs well for increased revenue generation. 
In 1986, Thailand introduced several measures that are aimed 
at generating additional revenues like increasing the rate and 
widening the scope of the tax on interest, increasing the tax 
rate on nonprofit organizations from 5 to 10 percent, widening 
the use of presumptive taxation, instituting a pay-as-earn system 
in the collection of personal income tax, and reducing the time 
lag between the accrual and the payment of tax liability with 
respect to business and professional income (Silpakul 1986, Asher 
1989) . Note that a number of these measures represent 
improvements in the administrative system rather than increased 
tax rates or the imposition of a tax on a heretofore untaxed 
item. On the other hand, the top marginal tax rate on personal 
income was reduced from 65 to 55 percent while the corporate 
income tax rate for companies not listed in the Thai Stock 
Exchange was decreased from 40 to 35 percent. If it is true, as 
Sicat and Virmani (1987) argue, that the top marginal tax rates 
on personal income in most LDCs apply to a very insignificant 
portion of the population, then it is likely that the combined 
impact on revenue of the base-broadening measures and the rate 
reduction will still be positive. 2/ Meanwhile, the reduction in 
the corporate income tax rate is bound to reduce, at least in the 
short run, the expected revenues from this source, given the 
time lag before positive supply side effects, if any, are felt. 
With regard to the revenue objective of tax policy, an 
examination of the recent trends in tax indicators in the ASEAN 
countries shows that to a large extent, policy initiatives are 
congruent with results. Tax effort defined as the ratio of tax 
revenues to GDP, declined in Malaysia and Singapore between 1980 
and 1988. While Indonesia's overall tax effort also went down 
because of the dramatic decline in the price of oil in the 
international market, its non-oil tax efforts registered 
significant improvements during the period that Malaysia's effort 
did not. Thailand posted a sharp increase in its tax to GDP 
ratio in 1987 and 1988. The Philippines exhibited a smaller 
increment after its 1986 reform and statistical tests suggest 
that the buoyancy of its tax system has just been restored to its 
-lot course, the exact effect will depend on the interaction 
of the marginal tax rate schedule and the distribution of income. 
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pre-1980s level after suffering considerable erosion in the early 
eighties (Manasan 1990). 
D. Resource Allocation Goals 
Following Gillis (1989a), we say that a tax change is 
"neutral" if it "raises the desired amount of revenue in such a 
way as to leave economic decisions unaffected, except by the 
effects of taxes in reducing real income and wealth." 3/ The 
primary aim of an economically neutral reform is to minimize, if 
not eliminate, the distortions caused by taxes on the choices 
faced by economic agents. Implicitly implied here is the need to 
look at effective tax rates rather than nominal tax rates in 
evaluating the neutrality of the tax sytem. In this sense, 
greater neutrality in taxation is generally associated with a 
shift toward greater uniformity in tax rates and greater 
consistency in the definition of the tax base. 4/ On the other 
hand, an "interventionist" tax reform is one where the tax system 
is used to deliberately influence various economic agents to act 
in certain ways that are deemed to be desirable by the 
government. In this context, tax policy is seen as an 
instrument for "targeting" the factors and/or activities that are 
associated with economic development. It goes beyond ensuring 
efficiency in the allocation of given resources. 
One of the four ultimate objectives of the Indonesian tax 
reform was "the removal of tax-induced incentives for waste and 
inefficiency" (Gillis 1985) . Given this perspective, the 
Indonesian tax reform scores high in terms of economic 
neutrality. Gillis (1989b) goes even farther to assert that in 
the Indonesian context, the shift implied by the tax changes is 
one that also leads to greater efficiency. This redirection of 
the tax system was achieved by means of the following: (1) the 
complete elimination of the highly complex system of tax 
incentives that were originally intended to promote specific 
activities/investments, whether domestic or foreign; (2) 
3./To quote again from Gillis (1989a), "an economically 
'neutral' tax structure is not necessarily an 'optimal' tax 
structure, nor even an 'efficient' one." 
—/in the case of commodity taxation, if neutrality is 
achieved by means of imposing uniformly low rates on a broad 
range of goods, it can be argued that such a move will also be 
efficient. This is because one of the most robust results (under 
various assumptions with regard to model specification and 
parameters) of the modern theory of optimal taxation is the 
conclusion that efficiency losses are positively related to the 
tax rates. Note further that from the more limited view of 
economic neutrality as well as from that of optimal tax theory, 
the taxation of intermediate inputs is seen as distortionary. 
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imposition of a three-tiered global income tax applicable to both 
firms and individuals to replace the very complicated personal 
income tax that was riddled with exemptions and special 
treatment (salaries of civil servants, interest income, income 
from cooperatives, capital gains, pension income, rental income, 
honoraria, leave and educational allowances and assorted fringe 
benefits) , and the corporate income tax that was also eroded by 
the numerous incentives referred to in (1); (3) the introduction 
of a broad-based (only small firms and unprocessed food are 
exempted) and uniform VAT (10 percent) imposed at the 
manufacture's level instead of the turnover tax that was 
characterized by a high degree of rate differentiation; and (4) 
improvements in tax administration and tax compliance with the 
conversion from a system where tax liability is determined via 
"official assessment" with frequent contacts between tax 
officials and taxpayers to one that is characterized by taxpayer 
assessment, greater depersonalization, automatic withholding 
methods, and computerization. The old system has resulted in the 
sharply uneven treatment of corporations and individuals. 
The abovementioned changes were aimed at the leveling down 
of such differences. Furthermore, the withdrawal of all tax 
incentives will alleviate the bias in favor of capital intensive 
activities and against small firms inherent in the earlier regime 
(Gillis 1985). Likewise, the enactment of the VAT effectively 
eliminates the inefficiencies associated with the implied 
taxation of inputs under the old turnover tax. Finally, the 
administrative innovations represented a frontal attack on tax 
evasion and avoidance. They not only increased the tax yield but 
also promoted the neutrality goals of the tax reform program 
since tax evasion drives a wedge in effective tax rates that are 
otherwise uniform. 
Malaysia, on the other hand, moved in the opposite 
direction. Exemptions from its sales tax were increased: the 
cut-off in the level of yearly gross sales used to define "small 
manufacture's" was raised five-fold to MS100,000 and the sales 
tax on certain consumer durables was abolished (although the 
coverage of the service tax was broadened). The fiscal 
incentives scheme has been made more liberal despite the 
elimination of some existing incentives. Additional exemptions 
(e.g., interest income) and deductions (e.g., expenses for the 
education of children abroad) from the personal income tax were 
also granted during the period. Asher (1988) has argued that 
these changes can "only widen the dispersion of effective tax 
rates by individuals, firms, and activities." one of the 
reforms currently being considered in Malaysia is the institution 
of a VAT in the medium or the long term. While the presence of a 
ring system extenuates the cascading effect of the sales tax in 
Malaysia, the experience of the Philippines has shown that the 
shift to the VAT is still a worthwhile movement from the resource 
allocation perspective. This follows from the fact that the 
reduction in that portion of the effective tax on consumption 
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imputable to input taxation is considerable even if the VAT took 
the place of a sales tax with tax credit provisions for inputs. 
The Philippines' Medium Term Development Plan of 1987-1992 
states that one of the principal objectives of fiscal policy is 
the improvement of efficiency. Specifically, it asserts that tax 
reform shall be directed at, among others, "withdrawing or 
modifying taxes that impair incentives to production, exports, 
and growth." 
In fact, however, the tax changes initiated from 1986 
onwards are a curious mix of economically neutral and 
interventionist measures. First, the shift from the schedular 
individual income tax system to one which is more global in 
approach has been shown to eliminate, in principle, the 
differences in the effective tax rates applicable to salaried and 
nonsalaried taxpayers in the same income bracket. However, 
improved neutrality of the tax system implied by this 
modification has been jeopardized by the failure of the 
government to reduce the avenues for tax evasion although the 
original package of tax reform measures included an 
administrative provision to this effect (Manasan 1990). Second, 
the move to allow spouses to compute tax separately is expected 
to reduce the distortion arising from the fact that the old 
provision subjected the wife to a higher marginal tax rate than 
the single individual. Third, the movement to a uniform 
corporate income tax rate from a graduated two-tiered rate 
schedule may also be expected to remove the biases inherent in 
\ the earlier form of the tax, i.e., eliminate the relative penalty 
against large and/or profitable firms. Fourth, the abolition of 
the tax on dividends eliminates the element of double taxation 
that is inherent in the previous system. Fifth, prior to the 
introduction of the VAT in 1988, the Philippines had a 
manufacturer's sales tax with a tax credit provision for inputs. 
Inspite of this, it was shown that because of the limited nature 
of the tax credit, considerable cascading still occurred such 
that on the average, about 50 percent of the effective tax rate 
may be traced to input taxes. Thus, the change to the VAT led to 
marked improvements in efficiency in this regard. However, there 
are a number of exemptions from the VAT: agricultural products, 
major inputs into agriculture, petroleum products, small 
producers, etc., so that some taxation of inputs still exist 
(Manasan 1990). 5/ Sixth, the elimination, in 1987, of the 
excise tax on fuel oil, which is an important input in 
production, also enhances economic efficiency. Finally, the 
enactment of the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 is diametrically 
opposed to the first four measures discussed above in terms of 
—^What these findings indicate is that the shift to a VAT 
will improve efficiency even if the tax it replaced is a sales 
tax with VAT-like features. 
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economic neutrality considerations. This Code has been 
criticized as being more distortionary than the previous 
incentive regime with regard to factor choice in production. It 
has also been shown that it resulted in the deterioration of the 
incentive scheme's capability to adequately compensate for the 
effective penalty on exports that is implied by the present 
protection structure (Manasan 1990). 6/ 
Singapore, on the other hand, pursued an interventionist 
apptoach to tax reform in the eighties. The three major goals of 
tax reform, as recommended by the Economic Committee, are: (1) 
consistency with Singapore's comparative advantage, (2) 
international competitiveness, and (3) provision of adequate 
impetus to the local and foreign work force to continue working 
in the country and to improve the quality of their work. The 
proximate objectives of tax reform are to attract foreign 
investment, to induce more investments in machinery and less 
in construction, to encourage certain activities, and to reduce 
labor and other business cost (Asher 1987). 
Consequently, Singapore has not only reduced the nominal 
corporate tax rate from 40 to 33 percent in 1987 but has also 
instituted countless tax incentives. These incentives take the 
form of exemptions/allowances/deductions relating to either 
specific expenditures like research and development, plant 
equipment, computers, or to investments in specific activities 
like fund management, warehousing and servicing industries, 
international consultancy services, nontraditional areas and 
those using new technologies. Tax expenditures are no less 
prevalent in the area of personal income taxation where 
employers' Central Provident Fund (CPF) contribution, interest 
income from CPF contribution, and interest income from deposits 
with the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) are exempted, and 
increased child relief especially for qualified women are 
provided. It is thus inevitable that the above changes will 
result in a wide dispersion of effective tax rates across firms 
and activities (Asher 1988). Specifically, the CPF-related tax 
expenditures are seen as distorting the inter- and intratemporal 
choices. On the other hand, the tax expenditures on corporations 
"may help create an artificial comparative advantage which in the 
long run may delay the adjustment of the economy to market 
forces— Depending on source of income, firms with the same 
income may be subject to different actual rates of tax. Since 
most of the incentives are granted to capital invested, labor 
intensive industries at every level of income are subject to 
higher though varying tax rates" (Lim et_al. 1988). 
-/The justification provided by the government for this 
change is the need to remain competitive with other countries in 
Asia in attracting foreign investment. 
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In Thailand, some of the recent tax changes may be viewed as 
movements towards a more economically neutral tax regime. For 
instance, the reduction in the corporate income tax rate 
applicable to firms that are not registered with the Security 
Exchange of Thailand mitigates the bias against small and 
unlisted firms arising from the rate differential between listed 
and unlisted firms (Krongkaew et al. 1988). Similarly, the 
taxation of interest income from government bonds and other types 
of deposits (that were not taxed before) has led to a closing, 
albeit incomplete, of the differences in the effective tax rates 
on different forms of financial savings. While the immediate 
impact of the wider application of presumptive taxation to small 
firms is on revenue collection, it is likely that this will also 
enhance the neutrality of the tax system given the generally 
accepted perception that tax evasion adversely affects both 
efficiency and equity. The reduction of the business tax, which 
is really a sales tax imposed at the manufactures' level, on 
intermediate products from 9 to 1.5 percent in 1983 alleviated 
the production distortions inherent in the cascading nature of 
the said tax. On a prospective note, the introduction of the VAT 
is currently being debated. Such a move will greatly improve 
overall economic efficiency. 
E. Equity Goals 
Distributionally-neutral tax reform is defined as one which 
aims to leave unaffected the existing relative distribution of 
income. On the other hand, a redistributive tax reform is one 
that is directed towards influencing the distribution of after-
tax income. Redistributive tax changes may either focus on 
improving vertical equity, i.e., a redistribution from the rich 
to the poor or it may content itself to the less ambitious goal 
of not making the poor worse off (Gillis 1989a). 
The following features of the Indonesian tax reform have 
served its redistributive goals well: (1) the exclusion of the 
poorest segments of the population from the tax net via increased 
deduction allowances, (2) the shift away from the old system 
where selected types of incomes (particularly those that are 
important to the higher income households) are either lightly 
taxed or exempted, (3) the exemption of unprocessed food (which 
accounts for a big portion of the expenditures of low income 
groups) from the VAT as well as the imposition of a sales tax on 
certain luxury products, (4) the levying of a uniform rate of tax 
on all property income with the provision that all buildings 
valued below a threshold level are exempted such that all low-
income housing are also outside the tax ambit (Gillis 1989b). 
Asher and Jomo *(1987) noted that the tax adjustments 
initiated in Malaysia in the 1980s are likely to adversely affect 
vertical equity. First, the reduction in rate schedule of the 
personal income tax favored taxpayers in the higher income 
brackets. While such a change may not have a significant impact 
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on vertical equity in countries like the Philippines and 
Indonesia where the top marginal rates apply to income brackets 
that are for all practical purposes empty, this is not true for 
Malaysia. Based on the old regime, the ratio of the income of 
the highest income tax bracket to the mean family income was a 
low 4.4, implying that the top marginal rate applied to a good 
number of taxpayers (Sicat and Virmani 1987). Also, in the 
period, there was an increase in the sales tax. Since indirect 
taxes are generally regressive, then this movement is likely to 
lead to a more onerous tax system on equity grounds. 
In the Philippines, equity is one of the stated goals of the 
1986 tax reform program. However, there has been some 
discrepancy between policy objective and policy result. For 
instance, the changes in the individual income tax should make 
the tax more progressive, in principle. However, the failure of 
the government to minimize tax evasion via the imposition of 
ceilings on tax deductions has made this unlikely. In contrast, 
the introduction of the VAT and the restructuring of the 
petroleum product taxes, most especially the elimination of the 
tax on fuel oil, has ameliorated the tax burden on the poorer 
sectors of the society (Manasan 1990). 
Distributional goals appear not to have played an important 
role in Singapore's tax reform. In fact, two specific measures 
launched in the 1980s may have worsened the regressivity of the 
tax system. These are: (1) the lowering of the marginal rate 
schedule of the personal income tax and (2) the increased child 
relief for "qualified women." While the latter change was put in 
place ostensibly to promote procreation among highly 
skilled/better educated (and presumably financially better off) 
women, it has the unintended effect of reducing their relative 
tax burden. 
In Thailand, the reduction in the personal income tax rate 
is not expected to have a negative impact on vertical equity. 
This is because the top marginal tax rate under the old system is 
irrelevant to a large extent because they are applicable to 
incomes that are 20 times that of the average family income 
(Sicat and Virmani 1987). However, the widening of the income 
tax base is likely to improve the distributional quality of the 
tax. This came about because the new inclusions in the tax base 
are previously exempted income like interest income, etc., and 
previously untaxed income (because of evasion) that are usually 
associated with the higher income groups. Sussangkarn, et_al. 
(1987) reported that the 1987 indirect tax structure was fairly 
neutral while the direct tax structure was progressive. Given 
earlier findings (notably by Krongkaew) that the old tax system 
was proportional, we can infer that the Thai tax reform was 
distributionally neutral if not redistributive. 
26 
F. Some Lessons 
Perhaps one of the most important lessons that can be drawn 
from the tax reform experiments in the ASEAN in the last decade 
is that the upgrading of tax administration is just as essential 
as modifications in the tax structure. It cannot be 
overemphasized that administrative improvements, unlike most of 
the changes in tax structure, have a positive effect on revenue 
enhancement and distributional and resource allocation goals. 
This is particularly true of measures aimed at minimizing tax 
evasion. Tax administration reform played a big role in the 
Indonesian experience. In contrast, it was observed that in the 
Philippines, the failure to do the same has jeopardized the good 
intent of structural changes. 
It is extremely important that enough lead time is spent in 
the formulation of the tax reform package as well as in the 
preparation for its implementation. This is a lesson that was 
learned the hard way by the Philippines, especially' with 
reference to the adoption of the VAT. Indonesia devoted a whole 
three years and a good amount of manpower in the preparatory 
stage prior to tax reform and most tax analysts agree that it has 
been quite successful in its effort because of this. 
The VAT does not only promote economic efficiency by 
eliminating the distortionary effect of input taxes but has also 
proven itself to be a virtual "money machine." In Indonesia, 
revenue from taxes on consumption rose from less than one percent 
of GDP to three percent of GDP with the introduction of the VAT. 
The Philippines was not as successful initially with the VAT 
revenue-wise because it got bogged down by administrative 
problems. However, in its second year of implementation, the VAT 
registered the highest growth in revenue amongst the various tax 
categories. Also, the VAT experience in the Philippines has shown 
that the gains in economic efficiency due to the shift to the VAT 
are large even if the tax replaced has VAT-like features. This 
is an important lesson for Malaysia and Thailand which are 
currently considering the adoption of the VAT. In Singapore, the 
arguments in favor of VAT take on a somewhat different task 
because of the absence of a general sales tax in Singapore at 
present. 
The propensity of the ASEAN countries to use investment 
incentives to influence the size, composition, and geographical 
distribution of investments was very marked in the eighties. 
While the economic literature is replete with the pitfalls in 
terms of the induced biases in factor choice and firm size as 
well as revenues lost to foreign treasuries in the absence of tax 
sparing agreements between host and capital exporting countries, 
most of the ASEAN countries have, in fact, maintained their 
interventionist stance in this regard. In 1986, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand have revised their 
investment incentive schemes ostensibly to remain competitive 
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with their neighbors. Only Indonesia has broken away from this 
mold. There are no indications that it has suffered undue 
disadvantage for doing so. 
The lowering of the schedule of marginal tax rates for 
personal income, a shift that is common to all the ASEAN 
countries, is not likely to make the tax any less progressive if 
it is accompanied by base broadening measures as in Thailand and 
Indonesia. This is because (X) in most of the ASEAN countries, 
the top rates in their old system apply to a segment of the 
population that is practically nil, (2) high tax rates encourage 
evasion, and (3) the income sources that were previously excluded 
from the base weigh heavily in the total income of higher income 
groups. At the same time, we note that base broadening greatly 
enhance the neutrality of any tax. 
Finally, we note that tax reform is usually directed at the 
attainment of multiple objectives. There are many instances when 
a particular tax measure will have satisfied on goal but not the 
other. The trade-off between efficiency and distributional 
considerations is highlighted in the empirical evaluation of the 
impact of the change to the VAT system in the Philippines. This, 
in turn, leads us to realize the importance of the proper use of 
government expenditure policy to address the redistributive goals 
of government. 
IV. GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE POLICY 
We have already noted that all the ASEAN countries with the 
exception of Singapore experienced severe fiscal imbalances 
during the early part of the eighties. While some efforts have 
been exerted to increase tax yields via a reform of the tax 
system, at least in the short run, the uses side of the 
government budget has had to undergo considerable adjustments as 
well. This arose because even if the tax reform measures 
discussed in the preceding section explicitly included revenue 
enhancement as a goal, their impact on revenue is usually not 
felt immediately. Furthermore, the tax reform has to address 
multiple objectives, not all of which are consistent with revenue 
mobilization. In medium term, it is increasingly becoming 
apparent that the resources available to the public sector are 
limited even after tax reform so that a revamp of government 
expenditure policy has also to be undertaken. The elements of 
such a reform include (1) control of the overall level of 
government spending, (2) priority-setting in its allocation, and 
(3) ensurance of the quality within each spending category (World 
Development Report 1988). 
In this section, we review the trends in the level and 
composition of government expenditures in ASEAN during the 
eighties. We also attempt to appraise whether the actual 
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allocation of public spending is in areas where the government 
sector has a comparative advantage based on the concept of public 
goods. Such a judgment, necessarily subjective, is premised on 
the view that government resources are best expended only "to 
complement and support - rather than compete with - market-
determined activities." Given time and resource constraints, we 
focus solely on a discussion of the "revealed" priorities in 
government spending in the ASEAN countries. An evaluation of the 
quality of government spending in particular sectors, an aspect 
which is just as important, is not included in this paper. 
A. Government Expenditures: Current vs. Capital 
During the early part of the 1980s, all of the ASEAN 
countries had to contend with large fiscal deficits. In response 
to this, fiscal austerity programs were pursued in all countries 
in the region with the exception of Singapore. Singapore, in 
fact, embarked on an expansionary expenditure policy in the 1980s 
which became even more aggressive in 1985 and 1986 presumably for 
purposes of demand management. In Malaysia, the burden of the 
fiscal adjustment program was shouldered primarily by the 
expenditure side. This was due to the fact that the tax measures 
introduced in the period were not revenue enhancing. 
Consequently, total government expenditures inclusive of net 
lending declined sharply from a peak of 46.6 percent of GDP in 
1981 to 28.3 percent of GDP in 1988. In the Philippines, total 
disbursement was cut from 15.8 percent of GDP in 1981 to 12.4 
percent in 1984. However, government expenditures rose to an 
all-time high of 17.6 percent of GDP in 1986 and has been 
maintained at comparatively high levels since. The resurgence of 
government expenditures in 1986 may be traced to the excesses in 
election spending in that year and the increased interest 
payments arising from the country's debt overhang. Thailand and 
Indonesia did not have to adjust its expenditures by as much as 
the other countries. For most of the eighties, they maintained 
their expenditures at levels close to 2 0 percent of GDP. (Please 
see Table 5.) 
In general, capital expenditures bore the burden of 
adjustment. Malaysia exhibited the deepest cut in capital 
expenditures with its 1988 level equivalent to just one-fourth of 
the pre-austerity level in GDP terms. Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand likewise reduced their capital expenditures by 
almost two thirds of their peak levels expressed in GDP terms. 
In contrast, Singapore's capital expenditure was 4.5 percent of 
GDP at the start of the decade and rose to 12.2 percent of GDP in 
1988. 
On the other hand, current expenditures proved resilient to 
the onslaught of fiscal austerity measures. In the Philippines, 
current expenditures have increased relative to GDP during the 
adjustment period. This was largely due to the increased 
interest payments resulting from the heavy debt burden that was 
Table 5 
AGGREGATE EXPENDITURE INDICATORS IN ASEAN COUNTRIES 1978-1988 
Country 
INDONESIA 
Fiscal Year Ending 
Total Exp. Net Lending /GDP 
Current Exp./ GDP 
Capital Exp. / GDP 
MALAYSIA 
PHILIPPINES 
SINGAPORE 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
1 9 8 5 1986 1987 1988 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
21.4 
22.8 23.5 25.6 22.4 23.6 20.1 22.5 
26.0 
22.8 
21.2 
31.0 30.6 39.4 46.6 
44.5 40.0 35.1 34.6 38.0 30.9 28.3 
14.8 13.7 14.4 15.8 15.5 13.8 
12.4 13.1 17.6 17.0 16.5 
23.0 23.0 24.2 28.9 27.5 30.1 25.1 35.8 37.7 35.6 
10.7 11.5 
11.7 .11.8 11.2 11.4 
10.8 12.1 14.2 15.5 15.6 
21.2 
21.6 
25.7 27.2 
26.6 26.4 24.9 25.9 
28.2 
25.7 23.8 
10.8 9.5 9.3 
8.6 9.3 9.0 7.9 
9.1 10.7 13.5 13.7 
15.7 15.6 15.6 18.3 16.7 17.1 19.5 
18.8 17.8 23.1 
9.6 9.7 10.4 12.6 10.5 
10.8 
8.5 9.9 
11.8 7.6 5.8 
6.3 
6.1 
9.9 15.4 11.3 8.3 5.4 5.0 
6.1 4.1 3.8 
3.8 3.8 4.9 
6.8 5.5 4.2 3.6 3.8 4.5 2.5 2.1 
3.9 4.1 4.4 5.0 4.6 5.5 6.7 8.4 
12.1 13.2 
THAILAND 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
16.6 17.4 19.6 
18.8 21.3 
20.0 19.6 21.9 
20.6 
18.8 
16.5 
12.2 13.4 14.5 14.8 
16.0 15.8 
16.2 17.3 16.5 15.4 13.6 
4.2 3.8 4.4 4.3 4.7 4.0 3.5 4.1 3.7 3.0 
2.4 
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incurred because of earlier fiscal excesses. It is worth noting 
that had interest payments been netted out of this expenditure 
category, the level of total current expenditures relative to GDP 
would have remained unchanged except during the crisis years of 
1983-1985. Furthermore, maintenance and other operating 
expenditures were reduced to half from 4.0 percent of GDP in 1980 to 2.1 percent in 1985. It has not quite recovered since then. 
Current government expenditures in Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand also increased during the period. In Indonesia, this 
movement was particularly marked in 1986-1987. In Malaysia and 
Thailand, increases were posted in the first half of the 10-year 
period but a downturn was registered in the second half. We do 
not have enough data on the breakdown of these current 
expenditures so we are not able to assess the reasons for these 
movements. 
What is disturbing about these trends are: (1) the sharp 
decline in maintenance expenditures, and (2) the marked reduction 
in capital expenditures for extended periods of time. While we 
realize that the governments of some of the ASEAN countries have 
poured money into unsound investment projects in the past, the 
continued reining in of public investments would greatly hamper 
the growth prospects of these countries particularly those that 
have not yet put in place the basic infrastructure needs of a 
developing economy. The lack of infrastructure is seen as a 
major bottleneck in Thailand and the Philippines. Furthermore, 
it is widely recognized that inadequate expenditure on 
maintenance is counterproductive as it leads to the premature 
deterioration of the existing stock of the assets. 
B. Functional Distribution of Government Expenditures 
Defense expenditures as a proportion of GDP declined almost 
consistently during the period in Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines. 7./ The cut in defense expenditure was most 
pronounced in Malaysia and the Philippines where current levels 
are just one-half of their peak levels when expressed as a ratio 
of GDP. Malaysia used to allocate around 18 percent of its 
budget on defense or about six percent of GDP so that even with 
this adjustment, its spending on this sector remains at par with 
that of Thailand (with 4 percent of GDP on defense expenditures) 
and slightly higher than that of Singapore. On the other hand, 
in 1988 the Philippines has the lowest government allocation on 
defense equal to 1.3 percent of GDP. There are some studies 
which indicate that military spending is negatively related to 
economic growth (World Development Report 1988). While these 
studies are by no means conclusive, it cannot be denied that the 
~/ln the Philippines, defense expenditures rose slightly 
after 1986. 
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opportunity cost of government expenditures on defense is high 
especially in countries with severe resource constraints. 
Corollary to the earlier observation regarding the downward 
trend in capital outlays, we note here the marked reduction in 
expenditures on economic services particularly on transportation 
and communication in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand in the eighties. The opposite trend is exhibited by 
Singapore. 
The Philippines and Singapore allotted an increasing portion 
of their budget on education. Thus, by 1986, Singapore's 
expenditure on education reached six percent of GDP. Despite 
this adjustment, education expenditure in the Philippines is 
equal to only 2.7 percent of GDP in 1988, one of the lowest in 
the region. These reallocations augur well for the 
redistributive goals of fiscal policy. 
Another noteworthy development is the decline in the 
central government transfers to statutory boards and government 
corporations in the Philippines and Malaysia. This perhaps 
reflects the positive results of government efforts to 
rationalize the operations of their public enterprise sectors. 
On a similar note, Malaysia has also reduced expenditures on 
commerce, industry and mining. This may be indicative of the 
withdrawal of the government from direct involvement in 
production activities that are best left to the private sector. 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore exhibited an 
increase in government expenditures on general administration. 
In the Philippines, government outlays on general public services 
proved to be more resilient than other items against expenditure 
cuts instituted during the economic crisis of 1983-1985. 
Moreover, in recent years, it has also recovered at a faster rate 
than most sectors. In fact, in 1988, general administration 
expenditures was more than two and a half times as large as 
government allocations for health. Similarly, Indonesia appears 
to be spending a disproportionate share (52.2 percent) of its 
budget on general public services as against 10 percent in 
education. These illustrate the possibilities with regard to a 
reallocation of the budget away from less productive to more 
productive areas. 
C. Some General Observations 
With the exception of Malaysia and to a lesser extent the 
Philippines, the ASEAN region does not appear to have resorted to 
an aggressive use of the expenditure side of the budget in terms 
of meeting distributional objectives or improving the overall 
allocation of the government budget (please refer to Table 6). 
The most significant reallocation that occurred is the 
decline in capital outlays. Admittedly, during periods when 
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quick fixes are needed in the budget, this is the most likely 
candidate. Extended periods of low public investments in basic 
infrastructure may, however, result in serious bottlenecks in the 
future. 
The discussion above is seriously limited by its failure to 
look at more detailed programs at the sectoral level. It has 
also hinted at another potent policy area: the reform of the 
public enterprise sector. There is a renewed interest on 
privatization and deregulation worldwide. The ASEAN countries, 
specifically the Philippines and Malaysia, have undertaken some 
adjustments in this area. Resource constraints forced us to 
leave a review of these issues to future work. 
Finally, we note that the particular circumstances that 
trigger the institution of reform measures vary from country to 
country. However, while the differences are many in terms of the 
type of policy instruments that were chosen, certain uniformities 
can also be discerned. Certainly, there are important lessons to 
be learned from each other's experience. 
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